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PLANNING EDUCATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
GaAy S.TtcldA
School o& thdu&tA^al B LabouA Relation* 
Cornell UniveJc*ity 
Ithaca, 14V 14850 (U.3.A. J
This paper presents the most important approaches to the economic® 
of education* Three topics are developed*
1* The logic of economic analysis of educational planning 
2„ Three approaches to educational planning
3. Evaluating the social rate™©f-return approach in a developing 
country context*
lm ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL PLANNING
A* Whv Conduct Economic Analysis of Education?
To some readers, the whole idea of analysing education in economic 
terms may seem strange* Some might ask* is it not crass to think of educ­
ation in economic terms? Does not investment in education represent an 
obviously meritorious use of social resources? Is there not overwhelming 
evidence that countries that spend more on education are richer, at least 
materially? Would not educational expansion be especially beneficial to 
the poorest citizens of a country--- those who are most likely excluded 
from education when enrollment ratios are less than universal? How can 
educators and social scientist!s with Ph.D1 even think it possible to 
have too much education?
The answers to all these questions are the same. Yes, education' is a 
good, but it comes at a cost* To spend more on education is to forego 
expenditures on health care, housing, construction of infrastructure, or 
whatever else the resources might have been used for had they not been 
devoted to education* The concern is not whether more education would 
produce benefits, since the benefits could hardly be nil* The proper 
issue is whether spending more on education is the best use of resources, 
taking account of what must be given up to provide education* In decid­
ing on the desirability of education and in planning educational systems, 
the benefits of education need to be assessed in relation to the costs* 
Never is economic analysis more important than when resources are scarcest 
a® in poor countries*
Recognizing, then, that an economic approach to educational planning 
is to be desired and not avoided, the appropriate question is hew is it
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to be done? The answers are developed in the ’£»maliiderc*f this report*
B* The Idea of Social Costs and Social Benefits
The economics of education compares the marginal social costs of
education to the marginal social benefits. The term "social" is meant
to indicate that the cost and benefits faced by all members of society,
both students and others, should be included* Among the social costs are
such items as buildings, teachers' salaries, pupils' fees, and the earnings
foregone by students while in school (Caution: Avoid double-counting.) The1social benefits include many factors: better jobs gained by the recipients 
of education; positive or negative effects of their employment on job 
opportunities for the less educated; higher on-the-job productivity; 
better ability to deal with disequilibria; enhanced social mobility; imp­
roved health, sanitation, nutrition and child-rearing practices; diminished 
birth rates; a more informed citizenry; greater community awaijpness and 
pride because of the presence of school; and spillovers into other areas 
of effective local development efforts. The adjective "marginal" in 
"marginal social benefits" signifies that any educational project or pr- . 
ogram should be evaluated in terms of the extra benefits that would be 
expected to result relative to the extra costs.
Typically, educational systems are set up so that costs precede bene­
fits. During the school years, society expends resources on education. The 
pay-off comes later, when the student is on the job and .in the world. The 
importance of this time pattern is that it enables us to draw upon a the­
orem in capital theory. The theorem states that when costs precede benefits, 
the two methods for evaluating investment programms-—  present value and 
internal rate of return—  yield equivalent decision rules. Let us now 
briefly review these two methods.
C . The Present Value Method
The present value method, as its name implies, determines the present 
value of future streams of costs and benefits. The descriptor "present"
iis meant to emphasize that a. dollar today is wroth more than a dollar in
the future. Or put differently, a dollar accruing in the future must be
discounted compared to a dollar offered at present. Denote the rate of
discounting by r. Ordinarily, we would expect that the appropriate discount
2rate would be the market rate of interest, i. For example, suppose i 
equals 10%. Then if I am offered the choice between receiving $100 today 
or $110 a year from now, I would consider these two income opportunities 
equally attractive.
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Thus*
(1) Value of Income this year m Value of income next year 
1+ discount rate
The present value of any project is the difference between the 
present value of benefits and the present value of costs*
(2) ^projects** ^benefits” costs
The present value of costs is the sum of the costs in each time period# 
appropriately 1
(3) FVcosts (1+r) Cl+r)
Likewise# the present value of benefits is*o o
B + 1 f 2 +
1+r (X+r)2
(4) PV.benefits • • ,+
(1+r)
The present value decision rule is*
Rule 1, Invest in a project if its present value is positive; do not 
invest otherwise.
Note that this decision rule is general enough so that any and all presumed 
social benefits and social costs of education can be factored into the
equation*
D, The Soclal-Rate-of-Return Method
The other method for social cost-benefit analysis is to calculate a 
social rate of return. This too relies on the notion of time discounting. 
However, it is done differently. Instead of using a specified interest 
rate r, the rate of return method finds that discount rate for which the 
present value of costs equals the present value of benefits. This is known 
as the "internal rate of return," or "rate of return" for short. So in 
the preceding example, if I could invest $100 today and receive $ 110 a 
year from now, I could calculate (using equation (1) that the rate of 
return on my investment is 10%, in this example, in which we have only 
a one year lag between the time of investment and the payoff date, the 
rate of return is given implicitly by equation CD and explicitly by*
(5) Rate of return on investment w Income Next year
Income This year "
To evaluate education projects, which involve many periods, the idea 
is the same, but the arithmetic is a bit more difficult. Use the same 
principle, i*e,, equate the present value of costs to the present value 
of benefits; by equations (3) and (4), this is
(6) CM “10 +— "-y  +
1+r ( 1 + r V
*+ ---- V m(1+r )A 0 +
-----
(1+r ) (1+r) (1+r)T
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The internal rate of return is that particular value of r, denoted here
by r , which makes the left hand side of (6) equal the right hand side,*Having found r , use the following internal rate of return decision jrule: 
Rule 2, If the Internal rate of return r is greater than the 
market rate of interest i, then the project under evaluation is 'worth­
while; otherwise not,
E , Equivalence of the two Methods
Now let us recollect from alsove the theorem stating that Rule 1 (the 
present value decision rule) and Rule 2 ( the internal rate of return dec­
ision rule) are equivalent under the conditions that apply to most educa­
tion investments. That is, we can talk about present value analysis as 
being equivalent to rate of return analysis. In view of this equivalence, 
the terms "social returns to education" and "social cost-benefit analysis" 
may be used interchangeably,
1 1  THREE APPROACHES TO EDUCATIONAL PLANNING
Any comprehensive approach to educational planning should take accou­
nt of the welfare gains and losses resulting from the provision of 
education. The first step in doing this is to specify what factors enter 
into one's judgements about social welfare and how education might affect 
those factors, Education has at least four such effects:
1, Education affects GNP, which affects social welfare;
2, Education affects inequality, which affects social welfare;
3, Education affects poverty, which affects social welfare;
4, Education itself affects social welfare.
This is summed up in the following flow charts
7? GNP
'4
Education - y, Inequality -> Social Welfare
Poverty
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A fornnal model a£ these effects Is available from the'author. The key- 
result is that the information .requirements are many and include such data 
as the types of jobs available to graduates, the impact of their employment 
on job opportunities for persons with less education, etc. But if perfect 
competition in labour markets is taken as working assumption,many of these 
information requirements are unnecessary, because the answers are assumed 
in the' competitive framework. This-may explain why the competitive 
framework is so popular in educational planning models? the data require­
ments are much less severe,
A , The Manpower Requirements Approach
Insofar as educational planning is done with an eye on costs and 
benefits, a frequent starting point is an analysis of manpower requirements. 
The "needs" of the economy for educated personnel are estimated, either 
by projecting employment patterns ir> various occupations or industries 
into the future, by asking employers bow maT»YPersons of a given type they 
want, by consulting employment services and advertisements, or some com­
bination of these. The outcome is a set of "requirements"? e.g,, 500 
engineers, 100 doctors, 0 economists, etc. The educational system in 
total and its specific faculties are then enlarged or contracted according 
to the dictates of the manpower forecast.
This way of planning education has been severely criticized. One 
complaint is that the method is excessively rigid; it does not allow for 
substitutability among educational or occupational groups. For example, 
school might be taught by untrained teachers, by teachers with secondary- 
level teacher training, or by graduates of university colleges of educat­
ion, but substitution of one category for another is not permitted in 
such manpower forecasts. Another criticism of the manpower requirements 
approach is that past forecasts have proven to be notoriously inaccurate* 
There is no reason to believe that future projections would be any better.
These and other criticisms are relatively minor as compared with a 
fundamental conceptual flaws the manpower requirements approach takes no 
account of costs. When employers state their manpower "requirements", 
they typically do so without regard to the cost of educating the engineers,, 
lawyers, economists, or teachers they are hiring* Would employers still 
want to hire the same number if they had to pay the costs of their educa­
tion? The likely answer is no. In economic analyses of education, all 
the benefits and costs of educated manpower must be considered. Since 
the manpower requirements criterion neglects costs entirely and looks 
only at private benefits, it is basically flawed as a method for
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educational planning.
In sum, the manpower requiranefcs approach starts with a good question; 
what jobs will there be for the graduates of the educational system?
However, the manpower requirements approach does not ask enough questions. 
What it leaves out is* to get these benefits, what costs have to be paid? 
For rational educational planning, thenanpower requirements approach is 
a useful starting point, but we must go further.
B. The Social-Demand-fo^Education Approach
The social-danand-for-education approach is popular among education­
ists, less so among economists. What this approach does is to quantify 
the "social.demand for education," by which is meant the number of people 
who want to attend school (or parents who want tp send their children to 
school). If the number desiring education is greater than the number of 
spaces, adherents of this approach would argue that more education should 
be provided. After all, so this line of reasoning goes, who would know 
more about the value of education than the people themselves?
This approach also is conceptually flawed. When people decide 
whether to send their children to school, they do so on the basis of the 
private costs of education in relation to the private benefits. The pri­
vate costs are what the individual or family must pay for education. The 
private benefits are what the individual or family receives. The private 
costs and benefits may diverge systematically from the social costs and 
benefits. On the cost side, educational systems in .developing countries 
are typically heavily subsidized. The school fees charged to students and 
their parents cover only a fraction of the total resource cost. Because 
the difference must be paid by taxpayers in the society, the social cost 
of education may be presumed to exceed the private cost.
On the benefit side of the equation, only by happenstance would the 
social benefits of education exactly equal the private benefits. There 
are two posifrilities*
(i) It may be that the individual who is educated benefits more from 
education than does society. This is likely to arise when wages do 
not fulfill a market-clearing function? more will be said about this 
later in this report. What is important for us now is that in this 
case the private benefits to education are apt to exceed the social 
benefits. Alternatively,
(ii) It may be that society benefits more from education than does the 
individual who is educated. Society may receive a whole host of 
benefits, some of which are alluded to earlier. Some of these
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benefits accrue to persons other than the individual who is educated. 
Economists call these benefits that accrue to other "externalities." When 
external benefits are large relative to private benefits, the possibility 
arises that the private benefits of education will be less than the social 
benefits*
In case (i), we have*
7.(A) The private cost of education is legs than {< ) the social cost 
of education.
(B) The private benefit of education is greater than (>) the social 
benefit of education.
(C) The private cost-benefit ratio is greater than the social cost- 
benefit ratio.
Condition (7.e) implies that the private rate of return to education will 
be larger than the social rate.
Consider now tdiat would happen if resources were to be allocated to 
education on the basis of the "social, demand, 1 i.e,, on the basis of the 
private return. If both the private and the social rates of return surp­
ass the market rate of interest, i ^  , if
„(8) Private rate x  Social rate Market rate 
of return * of return * of Interest,
We will reach the socially correct decision--- namely, to expand the edu­
cational system-- but we will have done so using the w ronq decision rule.
This is because we would have based the decision on the private rate of 
return when the logic of social cost-benefit analysis leads us to view 
the social rate of return as the appropriate decision criterion.
Suppose, however, that the market rate of interest were in between 
the private and social ratesof returns
(9) Private ratev Market rate >v.Social rate 
of return ^ o f  interest ^of return
In such a case, by using the private rate of return criterion, the socially 
incorrect decision would be reached. Too much education would he supplied, 
and it would be appropriate not to expand the educational system.
Alternatively, consider case (11), In which society benefits more 
from education than does the individual who is educated. In this case, 
we have*
(10) (a ) The private cost of education is less than the social 
cost of education.
(B) - The private benefit of education is less than the social 
benefit of education.
(C) The private cost-benefit ratio may be greater than, less
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than, or equal to the social-cost-benefit ratio. It follows from 
condition (10*0) that the private rate of return to education may be 
greater than, less than, or equal to the social rate of return* As in 
case (i), allocating resources to education on the “basis of the "social 
demand" would entail the wrong decision rule; but unlike case (11),the 
way in which the decision deviates from the social optimum (l.e. whether 
we end up with too much education being provided or too little) pannot 
be determined a priori. Once again, the "social demand" for education 
is a fallacious guide to public policy.
Actually, the very term "social demand" is a misnomer. It does 
not reflect the desires of taxpayers and other members of society who 
have to pay the costs of education or who may receive external benefits, 
it reflects only the perceptions by potential pupils and their parents 
of the private costs and private benefits of education. Consequently, 
economists typically refer to the number wanting education not as the 
"social demand" but rather as the "private demand for education," ther­
eby emphasising that the basis for this demand is a comparison of the 
private costs with the private benefits.
In sum, the social-demand-for education approach improves upon the 
manpower forecasting approach by including the costs of education as well 
as the benefits. However, the social-demand-tor-education approach rem­
ains deficient, because those costs and benefits that are included are 
private costs, whereas social decisions should be made on the basis of 
social costs and benefits* It is this which social rate of return 
analysis attempts to do.
c. The Social Rate of Return Approach
The social-rate-of-return approach endeavors to compare the social 
benefits of education with the social costs. Sometimes, social rates of 
return are calculated; other times, present values. Here is a brief out­
line of how it1s done in practice, (The following two paragraphs are
adapted from an article by one of the leading figures in the field,
3Dr, George Psacharopoulos) .
Estimates of the rate of return to a given level of education are 
calculated by comparing the discounted benefits over the lifetime of an 
educational investment "Project" to the costs of such project. Thus, for 
the calculation of the social rate of return to four years of university 
education,benefits are estimated by taking the difference between exist­
ing statistics on the mean pre-tax earnings of university graduates by 
age. and those of a sample group of secondary school graduates.
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The earnings of the latter also represents the opportunity cost of stay- 
ing in school* Direct costs should include the full emount of resources 
committed per student to higher education* rather than the usually 
smaller part of expenditure borne by the s tudent* Given these data * the 
rate of return to investment in a college degree compared with a secondary 
school qualification is the rate of interest that reduces to zero the net 
present value ofthe discounted difference between the costs and benefits. 
A simple equation for the social rate of return iss
(11) sog!al rate* 
of return
/mMean annual pre­
tax earnings of 
niversity graduates,1
four years 
study ;\ P) x h
V
Mean annual pre-tax 
earnings of secondary 
^school graduates ✓
'Mean annual pre-' 
tax earnings of 
secondary school.
^graduates
Note that this formula can be interpreted as the yield of a permanent con-
3—\ /Mean 
- ]^[ soci; 
)1J \cost
annual 
ial direct 
of study
stant stream of benefits ( the difference in earnings appearing in the 
numerator) over lump sum cost of projected earnings plus direct outlays 
(appearing in the denominator). Neither the permanent benefits assumption 
nor the lumping together of cost, are critical in the calculation* since
the latter occur within four years and the former extend over several
decades.
A private rate of return to college education could be calculated 
in the same way* although earnings should be post-tax (as the individual 
does not receive the earnings that are taxed) and the direct costs are 
obtained from statistics on a student's out-of-pocket expenditures that 
are steictly due to the cost of college attendance.
Social-retum-to-education analysis seeks to weigh the social bene­
fits of additional education against the social costs, in so doing* it 
asks the right questions. This is a major advantage compared to the 
manpower requirements and social demand for education approaches. Now good 
a job does the social-retum-to-education approach do in answering these 
questions? An evaluation of this method appears in Section III*
H I  EVALUATING THE SOCIAL RATE-OF-RETURN APPROACH IN A DEVELOPING COUNr 
TRY. CONTEXT
TO evaluate social-return-to-education analysis* let us ask four 
questionss
1. Are all costs included?
2*. Are all costs valued properly?
3. Are all benefits included?
4. Are all benefits valued properly?
In this section and in an unpublished appendix, I evaluate speial cost- 
benefit analysis according to these criteria* I conclude that social rates 
of return to education in developing countries as conventionally calculated 
have two serious problems <
1 * Much of what should be included is missing, and
*2. Much of what is included is not valued properly.
A. Are all the Relevant Costs Included?
Yes. The relevant costs include such direct outlays as costs of bui­
ldings, teachers' salaries, and educational materials, plus the indirect 
cost due to foregone.output while the children are in school. Nothing 
important is left out in the social rate-o£-return calculations.
B. Are the Included Costs valued Properly?
It depends. In computing social rates of return, the direct outlays 
are valued according to their dollar cost. This is appropriate if it does
not matter who pays the costs. But if public policy is concerned with all­
eviating povery and inequality and reaching the poor majority, the incid­
ence of costs matters. This is where the progressivity or regressivity 
of the tax structure and the size of the overall budget surplus or deficit 
enter in. In many LDCs, taxpayers as whole,, including many poor families, 
help subsidize the education of the few, draw disproportionately from the 
upper and middle classes.
The indirect costs (i.e., foregone output) in social return analysis 
are measured by the average earnings of persons without the educational 
level in question. Implicitly, this assumes that society loses that out­
put, because the jobs the students would have filled had they not been 
in school remain vacant. This assumption may or may not be correct; It 
depends on the characteristics of the economy in question.
C . Are all the Relevant Benefits Included?
No. social-rate-of-retum analysis deals explicitly only with the 
extra output that the economy is presumed to gain by educating more people. 
In a poor country, this probably is the most important bewefit of education. 
But other benefits, such as those listed at the beginning of Section,!, 
ate important too. Some of these are indirect te.g., the effect of edu­
cation on improved child-rearing practices) and others are non-quanfcifta­
ble (e.g., a well-informed populace able to enjoy the arts, literature, 
and the good things of life). The omission of these indirect and non- 
quantifiable benefits from social cost-benefit calculations is not 
particularly troublesome. It can be justified in the following way* We
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Know these other benefits exist* If Investing in education is cost- 
effective when only the output gains are considered/ then education is 
ail the more worthwhile when these other benefits are added in. But 
suppose the measured social benefits are smaller than the social costs/ 
say by $ 1/000, We then have an explicit standard against which to gauge 
the miscellaneous gains from educations are the unmeasured benefits worth 
$ 1/000? Though the economist can pose this question/ he cannot answer 
it— -that must be left to educationists/ planners/ and the people them­
selves.
Less aggregatively, conventional social cost-benefit analysis ignores 
such micro development objectives as reducing poverty and inequality and 
raising employment. When these concerns are relevant/ besides looking 
just at the number of beneficiaries/ it is of interest as well to examine 
the beneficiaries in terms of their socio-economic status,It should be 
shown that the beneficiaries will be drawn in large numbers from the 
target group? fears that educational expansion will cater exclusively 
or primarily to the elites should be allayed,
D, Are the Included Benefits Valued Properly?
It depends. If the labour market is competitive, yes? if not/ no.The 
included benefit is the extra output that would be produced by a better- 
educated labour force. As indicated earlier/ this extra output is appr­
oximated by the difference in annual earnings of persons with the educ­
ational level in question as compared to persons without. How appropr­
iate is this procedure?
On the positive side/ this methodology is well-warranted in the theory 
of competitive labour markets. In that theory, the last worker hired Is 
paid according to what he produces— the value of his marginal product. 
Furthermore, in competitive markets, wages adjust so that the supply and 
demand for different labour categories are in balance. If educated workers 
are paid more than less-educated workers, competitive theory says it is 
because the educated workers are more productive than the less educated. 
The extra output due to education is the value of marginal product of an 
educated worker minus the value of marginal product of a less-educated 
worker. Under the competitive assumption, the difference in their 
value of marginal products is identical to the difference in their ear- 
mings. And it is this difference in earnings that is taken as the 
measure of social benefits from education in social cost-benefit analysis.
The standard methodology has been questioned on several grounds. One 
is that some part of the earnings differential between educated and less- 
educated person is not due to education. The most important factor is
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differential ability. Secondary schools, colleges, and universities try 
to admit the most able students. These individuals probably would earn 
more than the average even if they didn't have the education. So some 
part of the earnings differential reflects ability, not education per se. 
In some studies, an adjustment factor (usually called "alpha") is introd­
uced to deal with tfhis problem? but alpha is selected arbitrarily rather 
than on the basi£ of scientific measurement.
Another difficulty with the standard methodology is the failure to 
distinguish between average and marginal returns to education. The 
average return to education is What is conventionally used. It is the 
difference in mean annual earnings. But economic theory tells us that 
decisions should be based on marginal costs and benefits. The implicit 
assumption in the conventional literature is that marginal benefit equals 
the average benefit.. This is a very strong assumption which may not be 
correct. To determine the marginal benefits from a proposed educational 
program, projections are needed on what th.e newly-educated persons will 
do. What type of work will they find when they leave school in the future 
and how much will they earn from it? How much more productive will they 
be in that work with education than without it? Are others with less 
education likely to be displaced, and if so, what will they do instead?
All these questions require a forward-looking approach. This is where 
educational planners and manpower planners need to work hand-in-hand.
But the most important difficulty with the standard methodology as 
applied to developing countries is the heavy reliance on an implicit con­
ception of how these countries' labour markets work. The standard appro­
ach is warranted in terms of competitive labour market theory. But what if 
the labour market is not competitive? Suppose, instead, that wages are 
set institutionally above the market-clearing level, and hence the quant­
ity of labour supplied exceeds the quantity demanded at the institutiona­
lly-determined wage. Then it may be shown that the cojswentional method 
of calculating social benefits overstates the output gains from additional 
education. The basic reason is that in non-competitive labour markets the 
newly-educated workers may not find jobs comparable to what previously- 
educated workers had been able to find. If the newly-educated workers 
are unemployed, then the marginal benefit to education ( at least ih out­
put terms) is aero. Alternatively, if the newly-educated workers take jobs 
that previously had been filled by less-educated workers, then the rele- 
evant question is* how much more productive are well-educated workers in 
those jobs than less-educated workers? There is no reason to think that
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they are several times more productive, which is what would be assumed if 
the productivity gain is approximated by the mean difference in earnings 
between educational groups.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Economic analysis of education should be conducted because the re sou-Ci­rces expended on education could be put to alternative uses. The marginal
social benefits of education must he estimated and evaluated in light of
these opportunity costs.
The cost and benefits of education may be coupared by calculating 
either a net present value or a social rate of return* These two methods 
give the same answers in educational projects, and so may be used inter­
changeably.
Various approaches are available for educational planning. The "manp­
ower requirements approach’1 is deficient, both be'cause it neglects costs 
and because manpower projections have not proven very accurate. The 
"social demand approach" also is deficient. Despite its name, it examines 
private costs and benefits? but social decisions should be based on 
social costs and benefits, not private ones. The "social cost-benefit 
approach" endeavors to quantify these social costs and social benefits.
In so doing, it embodies important aspects of both the manpower foreca­
sting and the social demand approaches.
How useful are the results from coventional social cost-benefit calcu­
lations? The answer depends on the circumstances in a particular country 
-— specifically, on the competitiveness of its labour markets. If the 
labour market is approximately competitive, then conventional social cost- 
benefit calculations are useful? otherwise not. Intuitively, the reason 
is that the conventional methods present average rates of return? the 
appropriate criterion for allocating resources is the marginal rate of 
return? and t£e average and the marginal can be presumed equal only when 
labour markets are competitive. In the majority of less developed count­
ries labour markets are thought to be very far from competitive. Only 
in relatively unusual instances, therefore, can conventional social 
rate of return calculations in developing countries be justified. This 
is not to say that social cost-benefit analysis should be dismissed. 
Rather, it should be done in more sophisticated ways*
Looking ahead, the social rate of return approach can and should be 
refined. One refinement would be to include .some of the things that are 
now excluded, such as the effects of educational expansion on inequality
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and poverty, looking both on the beneficiary side and on the cost side 
of the ledger. Another refinement would be to devise a methodology for 
assessing marginal social costs and benefits in the non-competitive labour 
market. The kinds of questions that planners should ask economists to 
answer ares what .kinds of jobs will1 the newly-educated workers get? How 
much more productive will they be in those jobs than less-educated workers? 
How many less-educated workers will be displaced? Wher^ will they go and 
how productive will they be elsewhere, if in fact they are employed at 
all? These are not easy questions to answer empirically; a great deal 
of new information is needed to'compute a marginal social rate of return 
to education. But unless planners have this information, 'how wise can 
their education decisions be?
Footnoteas
1. For fuller discussion of tine many social benefits that result from 
education, see C, Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean.Bowman, Education and 
Economic Development (chicagoi Al&lne, 1966), Lascelles Anderson and 
Douglas M. Windham, Education and Development (Lexington, Mass,; Heath 
Lexington Books C1!9S2Fai^l World Bank, Education Secfc&r Policy Paper 
(Washington, April, 1980).
2, The market rate of interest is* the correct criterion when capital mar­
kets a m  perfect. When they are not, e.g., when interest rates are 
artificially low, -then the appropriate discount rate is higher. Consult 
project appraisal manuals for more on this.
. “Education as an Investment," Finance and Development, September 1982.
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